| You cannot exclude this possibility of neutrality as
being one which may come within the immediate sphere of our
experience. The ports may be denied us in the hour of need, and we
may be hampered in the gravest manner in protecting the British
population from privation and even starvation. Who would wish to
put his head in such a noose? Is there any other country in the
world where such a step would even have been contemplated? It
would be an easy step for a Dublin Government to deny the ports to
us once we have gone. The cannon are there, the mines will be
there. But more important for this purpose, the juridical right will be
there. You had the rights; you have ceded them; you hope in their
place to have good will strong enough to endure tribulation for your
sake. Suppose you have it not. It will be no use saying, ?then we will
retake the ports.? You will have no right to do so. To violate Irish
neutrality should it be declared at the moment of a Great War may
put you out of court in the opinion of the world, and may vitiate the
cause by which you may be involved in war. You are casting away
real and important means of security and survival for vain shadows
and for ease.
211
The comment of The Times newspaper was illuminating:
The agreement on defence releases the Government of the United
Kingdom from the articles of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, by
which they assumed the onerous and delicate task of defending the
fortified harbours of Cork, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly in the event
of war.
Further releases might have been obtained by handing over Gibraltar to Spain and Malta to
Italy. Neither touched the actual existence of our population more directly.
With that I leave this lamentable and amazing episode.
212
An Unlikely Historical Controversy ? Hitler's Next Objective ? ?No Evil Intentions Towards
Czechoslovakia? ? M. Blum's Pledge ? My Visit to Paris, March, 1938 ? M. Daladier
Succeeds M. Blum ? The Anglo-Italian Pact ? An Interview with the Sudeten Leader ?
Misgivings and Reluctance of the German Generals ? The Relations of Soviet Russia with
Czechoslovakia ? Stalin and Benes ? Plot and Purge in Russia from Mr. Wedgwood,
M.P., which is interesting and characteristic. What is the position
about London? I have a very clear view that we should fight
every inch of it, and that it would devour quite a large invading
army.
Many thanks for your letters. I am hoping to get a great many
more rifles very soon, and to continue the process of arming the
Home Guard (L.D.V.). You may rest assured that we should fight
every street of London and its suburbs. It would devour an
invading army, assuming one ever got so far. We hope, however,
to drown the bulk of them in the salt sea.
(Action this Day.)
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.
3.VII.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
2.VII.40.
Prime Minister to Mr. Wedgwood.
5.VII.40.
265
It is curious that the German Army Commander charged with the invasion
plan used this same word ?devour? about London, and determined to avoid it.
What is being done to encourage and assist the people living in
threatened seaports to make suitable shelters for themselves in
which they could remain during an invasion? Active measures
must be taken forthwith. Officers or representatives of the local
authority should go round explaining to families that if they
decide not to leave in accordance with our general advice, they
should remain in the cellars, and arrangements should be made
to prop up the building overhead. They should be assisted in this
both with advice and materials. Their gas-masks should be
inspected. All this must be put actively in operation from today.
The process will stimulate voluntary evacuation, and at the same
time make reasonable provision for those who remain.
Clear instructions should now be issued about the people living in
the threatened coastal zones: (1) They should be encouraged as
much as possible to depart voluntarily, both by the pressure of a
potential compulsory order hanging over them, and also by local
(not national) propaganda through their Regional Commissioners
or local bodies. Those who wish to stay, or can find nowhere to
go on their own, should be told that if invasion impact occurs in
their town or village on the coast they will not be able to leave till
the battle is over. They should therefore be encouraged and
helped to put their cellars in order so that they have fairly safe
places to go to. They should be supplied with whatever form of
Anderson shelter is now available (I hear there are new forms not
involving steel). Only those wa release from this daily martyrdom.
And I prefer death to witnessing the shame and irreparable
damage of an Italy which has been under Hun domination.
The crime which I am now about to expiate is that of having
witnessed and been disgusted by the cold, cruel, and cynical
preparation for this war by Hitler and the Germans. I was the
only foreigner to see at close quarters this loathsome clique of
bandits preparing to plunge the world into a bloody war. Now, in
accordance with gangster rule, they are planning to suppress a
dangerous witness. But they have miscalculated, for already a
long time ago I put a diary of mine and various documents in a
safe place which will prove, more than I myself could, the crimes
committed by those people with whom later that tragic and vile
puppet Mussolini associated himself through his vanity and
disregard of moral values.
I have made arrangements that as soon as possible after my
death these documents, of the existence of which Sir Percy
Loraine was aware at the time of his Mission in Rome, should be
put at the disposal of the Allied Press.
134
Perhaps what I am offering you today is but little, but that and
my life are all I can offer to the cause of liberty and justice, in the
triumph of which I fanatically believe.
This testimony of mine should be brought to light so that the
world may know, may hate and may remember, and that those
who will have to judge the future should not be ignorant of the
fact that the misfortune of Italy was not the fault of her people
but due to the shameful behaviour of one man.
Yours sincerely
G. CLANO
* * * * *
A speech from President Roosevelt had been announced for the night of the
10th. About midnight I listened to it with a group of officers in the Admiralty
War Room, where I still worked. When he uttered the scathing words about
Italy, ?On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has
struck it into the back of its neighbor,? there was a deep growl of satisfaction.
I wondered about the Italian vote in the approaching presidential election; but
I knew that Roosevelt was a most experienced American party politician,
although never afraid to run risks for the sake of his resolves. It was a
magnificent speech, instinct with passion and carrying to us a message of
hope. While the impression was strong upon me, and before going to bed, I
expressed my gratitude.
We all listened to you last night and were fortified by the grand
scope which
would close the Straits both by night and day. With a major
campaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean and the need
to reinforce and supply our armies there all round the Cape, we
could not contemplate any military action on the mainland at or
near the Straits. The Rock of Gibraltar will stand a long siege, but
what is the good of that if we cannot use the harbour or pass the
Straits? Once in Morocco, the Germans will work southward, and
U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating freely from
Casablanca and Dakar. I need not, Mr. President, enlarge upon
the trouble this will cause to us, or the approach of trouble to the
Western Hemisphere. We must gain as much time as possible.
This great danger had in fact passed away, and, though we did not know it, it
passed forever. It is fashionable at the present time to dwell on the vices of
General Franco, and I am, therefore, glad to place on record this testimony to
the duplicity and ingratitude of his dealings with Hitler and Mussolini. I shall
presently record even greater services which these evil qualities in General
Franco rendered to the Allied cause.
523
Mussolini?s Decision to Attack Greece ? His Letter to Hitler of October 19 ?
The Florence Conference ? The Italian Invasion of Greece, October 28, 1940
? Reinforcement of Admiral Cunningham?s Fleet ? The Arrival of the
?Illustrious? ? Our Obligations ? Importance of Crete ? Telegrams to Mr.
Eden ? Air Support for Greece ? Minute to Chief of the Air Staff, November
2, 1940 ? Wavell-Wilson Plans for an Offensive in Libya ? Secrecy Causes
Misunderstanding ? Further Telegrams to Mr. Eden ? Greek Need for the
Cretan Division ? Mr. Eden?s Latest Telegrams ? His Return ? He Unfolds
?Operation Compass? ? General Agreement ? War Cabinet Approves ? The
Fleet Air Arm Attack the Italian Fleet ? Gallant Exploit at Taranto ? Half the
Italian Fleet Disabled for Six Months ? Naval Dispositions ? My Desire for an
Amphibious Feature in ?Compass? ? My Telegram to Wavell of November 26
? Policy Towards Turkey ? An Improved Situation ? Shortcomings at Suda
Bay ? Death of Mr. Chamberlain ? A Tribute to His Memory.
A FRESH, though not entirely unexpected outrage by Mussolini, with baffling
problems and far-reaching consequences to all our harassed affairs, now
broke upon the Mediterranean scene.
The Duce took the final decision to attack Greece on October 15, 1940. That
morning a meeting of the Italian war leaders was held in th to
consult together upon the conduct of the war in the Middle East
(in which they are all three concerned), and to advise me, as
Minister of Defence, upon the recommendations I should make to
the Cabinet. Will you kindly put this into the proper form? The
Secretary of State for War has agreed to take the chair.
Mr. Eden reported to his Committee the shortage of troops, equipment, and
resources in the Middle East, and that the C.I.G.S. was equally perturbed. The
Committee urged the full equipment of the armoured division already in Egypt
but far below strength, and also recommended the provision of a second
armoured division at the earliest moment when it could be spared from home.
The Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions, the C.I.G.S. observing that the
moment must be chosen in relation to declining risks at home and increasing
risks abroad. On July 31, Mr. Eden considered that we might be able to spare
some tanks in a few weeks? time, and that if they were to reach the Middle
East by the end of September we might have to send them and the other
equipment through the Mediterranean. In spite of the rising tension about
invasion at home, I was in full agreement with all this trend of thought, and
brought the extremely harassing choice before the Cabinet several times.
The other aspects of the Middle East pressed upon me.
Where is the South African Union Brigade of ten thousand men?
Why is it playing no part in the Middle East? We have agreed
today to send further reinforcements of Hurricanes and other
modern aircraft to the South African Air Force. What is happening
to the concert of the campaign in the Middle East? What has
Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges. 10.VII.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
23.VII.40.
413
been done by the Committee of Ministers I recently set up? Now
that large naval operations are contemplated in the
Mediterranean, it is all the more essential that the attack on the
Italian position in Abyssinia should be pressed and concerted by
all means. Make sure I have a report about the position, which I
can consider on Thursday morning.
I felt an acute need of talking over the serious events impending in the Libyan
Desert with General Wavell himself. I had hot met this distinguished officer,
on whom so much was resting, and I asked the Secretary of State for War to
invite him over for a week for consultation when an opportunity could be
found. He arrived on August 8. He toiled with the Stafsecond alternative, i.e., [granting ofwas violent and brave, the second son Cha He Tai [Chagatai U 47 crept quietly away back through the gap. A
blockship arrived twenty-four hours later.
This episode, which must be regarded as a feat of arms on the part of the German U-boat
commander, gave a shock to public opinion. It might well have been politically fatal to any
Minister who had been responsible for the pre-war precautions. Being a newcomer I was
immune from such reproaches in these early months, and moreover, the Opposition did not
attempt to make capital out of the misfortune. On the contrary, Mr. A. V. Alexander was
restrained and sympathetic. I promised the strictest inquiry.
368
On this occasion the Prime Minister also gave the House an account of the German air raids
which had been made on October 16 upon the Firth of Forth. This was the first attempt the
Germans had made to strike by air at our Fleet. Twelve or more machines in flights of two
or three at a time had bombed our cruisers lying in the Firth. Slight damage was done to
the cruisers Southampton and Edinburgh and to the destroyer Mohawk. Twenty-five
officers and sailors were killed or wounded; but four enemy bombers were brought down,
three by our fighter squadrons and one by the anti-aircraft fire. It might well be that only
half the bombers had got home safely. This was an effective deterrent.
The following morning, the seventeenth, Scapa Flow was raided, and the old Iron Duke,
now a demilitarised and disarmoured hulk used as a depot ship, was injured by near
misses. She settled on the bottom in shallow water and continued to do her work
throughout the war. Another enemy aircraft was shot down in flames. The Fleet was
happily absent from the harbour. These events showed how necessary it was to perfect the
defences of Scapa against all forms of attack before allowing it to be used. It was nearly six
months before we were able to enjoy its commanding advantages.
* * * * *
The attack on Scapa Flow and the loss of the Royal Oak provoked instant reactions in the
Admiralty. On October 31, accompanied by the First Sea Lord, I went to Scapa to hold a
second conference on these matters in Admiral Forbes' flagship. The scale of defence for
Scapa upon which we now agreed included reinforcement of the booms and additional
blockships in the exposed eastern channels, as well as controlled minefields and other
devices. These formidable deterrents would be reinforced by further patrol craft and guns
sited to cover all approaches. Against air attack it was planned and a small one, and we were very close, I
fired my two torpedoes from my tubes [aftstandard
and accepted parity with America. How about the Army? How about the air
force? For the land and air defence forces England needs above all men, not
merely money, but also the lives of her citizens for Empire defence. Indeed,
of the eleven thousand men needed for the new air programme, seven
thousand are lacking. Again, the small Regular Army shows a large
deficiency, about one whole division, and the Territorial Army (a sort of
Sunday-School for amateur soldiers) is so far below its authorised numbers
that it cannot in any way be considered an effective combatant force. Mr.
Baldwin himself said a short time ago that he had no intention of changing
the system of recruiting by the introduction of conscription.
144
A policy which seeks to achieve success by postponing decisions can today
hardly hope to resist the whirlwind which is shaking Europe and indeed the
whole world. Few are the men who, upon national and not upon party
grounds, rage against the spinelessness and ambiguous attitude of the
Government, and hold them responsible for the dangers into which the
Empire is being driven all unaware. The masses seem to agree with the
Government that the situation will improve by marking time, and that by
means of small adjustments and carefully thought -out manoeuvres the
balance can once again be rectified.
Today all Abyssinia is irrevocably, fully, and finally Italian alone. This being
so, neither Geneva nor London can have any doubt that only the use of
extraordinary force can drive the Italians out of Abyssinia. But neither the
power nor the courage to use force is at hand.
All this was only too true. His Majesty's Government had imprudently advanced to
champion a great world cause. They had led fifty nations forward with much brave
language. Confronted with brute facts Mr. Baldwin had recoiled. Their policy had for a long
time been designed to give satisfaction to powerful elements of opinion at home rather
than to seek the realities of the European situation. By estranging Italy they had upset the
whole balance of Europe and gained nothing for Abyssinia. They had led the League of
Nations into an utter fiasco, most damaging if not fatally injurious to its effective life as an
institution.
145
A New Atmosphere in Britain ? Hitler Free to Strike ? Ratification of the Franco -Soviet Pact
? The Rhineland and the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno ? Hitler Reoccupies the
Rhineland, March 7 ? French Hesitation ? Flain the
meanwhile, so long as he gets their light tanks. I am prepared to
risk the fifty Infantry tanks in the Mediterranean, provided their
personnel is distributed among H.M. ships; but there can be no
question of them or their personnel going by the Cape, thus
making sure they are out of everything for two months. The
personnel sent through the Mediterranean must be cut down to
essentials, the balance going round.
Pray let me have further proposals by tomorrow (Monday).
1. Just before the French went out of the war, Admiral Darlan
bombarded Genoa in full daylight without any Asdic destroyer
protection, or any aircraft protection, and returned to Toulon
unscathed. The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet has three times
advanced to the centre of the Mediterranean and returned to
Alexandria with only one ship ? Gloucester ? hit by one bomb. A
few weeks ago a fast and a slow convoy were conducted
uninjured from Malta to Alexandria ? two days of their voyage
being beset by Italian aircraft.
2. The Admiralty now propose to send six destroyers from
Alexandria to meet Force ?H.? These destroyers, which will
certainly be detected from the air, will be within air-attacking
distance of the very numerous, fast Italian cruiser forces in their
home bases. This movement should be rightly condemned as
hazardous in the extreme but for the just estimation in which
Italian naval enterprise is held by C.-in-C. Mediterranean and the
Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.
13.VIII.40.
438
Admiralty.
3. We are now told that it is too dangerous for the powerful
forces we shall have in motion in the near future to carry through
to the Eastern Mediterranean two M.T. [mechanical transportnine feet, thus enabling
a certain channel where the depth is only twenty-six feet to be passed. There are at
present no guns commanding this channel, and the States on either side are neutral.
Therefore there would be no harm in hoisting the armour belt temporarily up to the water
level. The method proposed would be to fasten caissons [bulgescome to a
thorough understanding. This idea had also been expressed in
Stalin?s letter. A delimitation of the spheres of influence must also
be sought. On this point, however, he (Molotov) could not take a
definitive stand at this time, since he did not know the opinion of
579
Stalin and of his other friends in Moscow in the matter. However,
he had to state that all these great issues of tomorrow could not
be separated from the issues of today and the fulfilment of
existing agreements? .
Thereupon Herr Molotov cordially bade farewell to the Reich
Foreign Minister, stressing that he did not regret the air-raid
alarm, because he owed to it such an exhaustive conversation
with the Reich Foreign Minister.
* * * * *
When in August, 1942, I first visited Moscow I received from Stalin?s lips a
shorter account of this conversation which in no essential differs from the
German record, but may be thought more pithy.
?A little while ago,? said Stalin, ?the great complaint against
Molotov was that he was too pro-German. Now everyone says he
is too pro -British. But neither of us ever trusted the Germans. For
us it was always life and death.? I interjected that we had been
through this ourselves, and so knew how they felt. ?When
Molotov,? said the Marshal, ?went to see Ribbentrop in Berlin in
November of 1940, you got wind of it and sent an air raid.? I
nodded. ?When the alarm sounded, Ribbentrop led the way down
many flights of stairs to a deep shelter sumptuously furnished.
When he got inside, the raid had begun. He shut the door and
said to Molotov: ?Now here we are alone together. Why should
we not divide?? Molotov said: ?What will England say?? ?England,?
said Ribbentrop, ?is finished. She is no more use as a Power.? ?If
that is so,? said Molotov, ?why are we in this shelter, and whose
are these bombs which fall?? ?
* * * * *
The Berlin conversations made no difference to Hitler?s deep resolve. During
October, Keitel, Jodl, and the German General Staff had under his orders been
forming and shaping the plans for the eastward movement of the German
armies and for the invasion of Russia in the early summer of 1941. It was not
580
necessary at this stage to decide on the exact date, which might also be
affected by the weather. Having regard to the distances to be traversed after
the frontiers were crossed, and the need of taking Moscow before the winter
began, it was obvious that the beginning of May offered the best prospectsconquered locally, it would be natural that events should
follow the above course. But if America continued neutral, and we
were overpowered, I cannot tell what policy might be adopted by
a pro-German administration such as would undoubtedly be set
up.
Although President is our best friend, no practical help has
[reached usbroken by the Soviet ice-breaker, should the attempt be made. The ore
from Narvik must be stopped by laying successively a series of small
minefields in Norwegian territorial waters at the two or three suitable points
on the coast, which will force the ships carrying ore to Germany to quit
territorial waters and come onto the high seas, where, if German, they will
be taken as prize, or, if neutral, subjected to our contraband control. The
ore from Oxelosund, the main ice-free port in the Baltic, must also be
prevented from leaving by methods which will be neither diplomatic nor
military. All these three ports must be dealt with in various appropriate ways
as soon as possible.
3. Thus, it is not a question of denying Germany a mere million tons
between now and May, but of cutting off her whole winter supply except the
negligible amounts that can be got from Gavle, or other minor ice-free Baltic
ports. Germany would, therefore, undergo a severe deprivation, tending to
crisis before the summer. But when the ice melts in the Gulf of Bothnia the
abundant supply from Lulea would again be open, and Germany is no doubt
planning, not only to get as much as she can during the winter, but to make
up the whole nine and a half million tons which she needs, or even more,
between May 1 and December 15, 1940. After this she might hope to
organise Russian supplies and be able to wage a very long war.
410
4. It may well be that, should we reach the month of May with Germany
starving for ore for her industries and her munitions, the prevention of the
reopening of Lulea may become [for us Some further reinforcement will be required for Narvik, which
must be studied at once. The Canadians should be considered.
9. At the same time, the sweep of the Skagerrak will now become possible
to clear away the enemy anti -submarine craft and aid our submarines.
The next day I explained to the War Cabinet the circumstances in which it had been
decided to call off the direct assault on Trondheim, and stated that the new plan which the
Prime Minister had approved was, broadly, to send the whole of the 1st Light Division of
Chasseurs Alpins to General Carton de Wiart for his attack on the Trondheim area from the
north and to send the regular brigades from France to reinforce Brigadier Morgan, who had
landed at Andalsnes and had pushed on troops to hold Dombas. Another Territorial brigade
would be put in on the southern line. It might be possible to push part of this southern
473
force right forward to reinforce the Norwegians on the Oslo front. We had been fortunate in
getting all our troops ashore, without loss so far (except of the ship carrying all Brigadier
Morgan's vehicles), and the present plans provided for the disembarkation of some twentyfive
thousand men by the end of the first week in May. The French had offered two further
light divisions. The chief limiting factor was the provision of the necessary bases and lines
of communication on which the forces were to be maintained. The bases would be liable to
heavy air attack.
The Secretary of State for War then said that the new plan was little less hazardous than
the direct attack on Trondheim. Until we had secured the Trondheim aerodrome, little could
be done to offset the heavy scale of enemy air attack. Nor was it altogether correct to
describe the new plan as a ?pincer movement? against Trondheim, since while the northern
force would bring pressure to bear in the near future, the first task of the southern force
must be to secure themselves against a German attack from the south. It might well be a
month before any serious move could be made against Trondheim from this direction. This
was a sound criticism. General Ironside, however, strongly supported the new movement,
expressing the hope that General Carton de Wiart, who when reinforced by the French
would have, he said, quite a large force at his disposal, a large part of which would be
highly mobile, might get astride of the railway from Trondheim to Sweden. The troops
already at Dombas had no guns or transpohas sunk, the Glorious is sinking,
the least we can do is make a show, good luck to you all. ? We then
altered course into our own smoke-screen. I had the order stand by
to fire tubes 6 and 7, we then came out of the smokescreen, altered
course to starboard firing our torpedoes from port side. It was then I
had my first glimpse of the enemy, to be honest it appeared to me
to be a large one [ship
Presume he knows that British and French are fighting their way
to coast between Gravelines and Ostend inclusive, and that we
propose to give fullest support from Navy and Air Force during
hazardous embarkation. What can we do for him? Certainly we
cannot serve Belgium?s cause by being hemmed in and starved
out. Our only hope is victory, and England will never quit the war
whatever happens till Hitler is beat or we cease to be a State.
Trust you will make sure he leaves with you by aeroplane before
too late. Should our operation prosper and we establish [anconfirms my
apprehensions about Malta. Beaches defended on an average
battalion front of fifteen miles, and no reserves for counter-attack
worth speaking of, leave the island at the mercy of a landing
force. You must remember that we do not possess the command
of the sea around Malta. The danger, therefore, appears to be
extreme. I should have thought four battalions were needed, but,
owing to the difficulty of moving transports from the west, we
must be content with two for the moment. We must find two
good ones. Apparently there is no insuperable difficulty in
accommodation.
* white paddington chloe bag * * * *
When I look back on all these worries, I remember the story of the old man
who said on his deathbed that he had had a lot of trouble in his life, most of
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.I.G.S.
21.IX.40.
465
which had never happened. Certainly this is true of my life in September,
1940. The Germans were beaten in the Air Battle of Britain. The overseas
invasion of Britain was not attempted. In fact, by this date Hitler had already
turned his glare to the East. The Italians did not press their attack upon
Egypt. The tank brigade sent all round the Cape arrived in good time, not
indeed for a defensive battle of Mersa Matruh in September, but for a later
operation incomparably more advantageous. We found means to reinforce
Malta before any serious attack from the air was made upon it, and no one
dared to try a landing upon the island fortress at any time. Thus September
passed.
466
Importance of Aiding General de Gaulle ? Plan for Liberating Dakar ? Need
to Support the Free French Forces ? My Minute of August 8, 1940 ? The War
Cabinet Approves ?Operation Menace? ? Dangers of Delay and Leakage ?
Message from ?Jacques? ? Our Second String ? The French Cruisers Sighted
? A Failure at Whitehall ? Too Late ? I Advise the War Cabinet to Abandon
the Project ? Strong Desire of the Commanders to Attack ? General de
Gaulle?s Persistence ? The War Cabinet Gives Full Discretion to the
Commanders ? My Telegram to General Smuts and President Roosevelt ?
The Attack on Dakar ? Ships Versus Forts ? Stubborn Resistance of the Vichy
French ? We Suffer Appreciable Naval Losses ? Cabinet and Commanders
Agreed to Break Off ? Changes of R?le at Home and on the Spot ?
Justification of the Commanders ? Parliament Requires No Explanations.
A T THIS TIME His Majesty?s Government attached great importance to aiding
General de Gaulle and the Free French to raupon the enemy communications be
possible? Are the enemy resources sufficient to hold down all the
countries at present conquered as well as a large part of France,
while they are fighting the French Army and Great Britain?
(4) Is it not possible thus to prolong the resistance until the
United States come in?
General weygand, while agreeing with the conception of the counter -stroke on
the lower Seine, said that he had inadequate forces to implement it. He added
that, in his judgment, the Germans had got plenty to spare to hold down all
the countries at present conquered as well as a large part of France. Reynaud
added that the Germans had raised fifty-five divisions and had built four
thousand to five thousand heavy tanks since the outbreak of war. This was of
course an immense exaggeration of what they had built.
In conclusion, I expressed in the most formal manner my hope that if there
was any change in the situation the French Government would let the British
Government know at once, in order that they might come over and see them
at any convenient spot, before they took any final decisions which would
govern their action in the second phase of the war.
We then took leave of P?tain, Weygand, and the staff of G.Q.G., and this was
the last we saw of them. Finally I took Admiral Darlan apart and spoke to him
159
alone. ?Darlan, you must never let them get the French Fleet. ? He promised
solemnly that he would never do so.
* * * * *
The morning was cloudy, thus making it impossible for the twelve Hurricanes
to escort us. We had to choose between waiting till it cleared up or taking a
chance in the Flamingo. We were assured that it would be cloudy all the way.
It was urgently necessary to get back home. Accordingly we started alone,
calling for an escort to meet us, if possible, over the Channel. As we
approached the coast, the skies cleared and presently became cloudless. Eight
thousand feet below us on our right hand was Havre, burning. The smoke
drifted away to the eastward. No new escort was to be seen. Presently I
noticed some consultations going on with the captain, and immediately after
we dived to a hundred feet or so above the calm sea, where aeroplanes are
often invisible. What had happened? I learned later that they had seen two
German aircraft below us firing at fishing-boats. We were lucky that their
pilots did not look upward. The new escort met us as we approached the
English shore, and the faithful Flamin Air
attack on the Fleet at Alexandria is not necessarily less effective
from one hundred and twenty miles distance than from twenty
miles, since aeroplanes often fly at three hundred miles per hour
and have ample endurance. In practice it is usually thought
Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.
27.V1II.40.
668
better to hold aerodromes a little back of the actual fighting line.
They do not move forward concurrently with the fronts of armies.
Everyone here understands the grievous consequence of the fall
of Alexandria, and that it would probably entail the Fleet leaving
the Mediterranean. If, however, you have any helpful suggestion
to make for the more effective defence of Mersa Matruh or of any
positions in advance of it, I should be obliged if you would tell
me.
Now that the long nights are approaching, the question of the
blackout must be reviewed. I am in favour of a policy, not of
black-out but of blnckable -out. For this purpose a considerable
system of auxiliary electric street-lighting must be worked out.
The whole of the centre of London, now lighted by incandescent
gas, must be given priority. The best methods in the centres of
other great cities must also be studied and local schemes must be
examined. Thus the lights can be switched down and up and
finally out on an air-raid warning being given. The lights
themselves should not be of a too brilliant character. The
subdued lighting of shop windows must also be studied with a
view to extending the facilities given last Christmas on a
permanent basis. Where factories are allowed to continue
working at night in spite of the black-out, there can be no
objection to extending blackable-out lighting to the surrounding
districts, thus tending to make the target less defined.
Consideration should also be given to decoy lighting and battle
lighting in open spaces at suitable distances from vulnerable
points.
I was much concerned on visiting Mansion Aerodrome yesterday
to find that, although more than four clear days have passed
since it was last raided, the greater part of the craters on the
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for Joint Planning Staff. 28.VIII.40.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air, C.A.S., and General
Ismay.
29.VIII.40.
669
landing ground remained unfilled, and the aerodrome was barely
serviceable. When you remember what the Germans did at the
Stavanger aerodrome and the enormous rapidity with which
craters were filled, I muare encouraging.
You should ask General Pile, however, to send in the account for
September.
I should like to see a return of the ammunition fired every
twenty-four hours during September as soon as possible.
I am sure we ought to increase our steel purchases from the
United States so as to save tonnage on ore. 1 should like to buy
another couple of million tons, in various stages of manufacture.
Then we should be able to resume the plan of the Anderson
shelters, and various other steel requirements which press upon
us. 1 would if necessary telegraph to the President.
OCTOBER
This shows the very serious misconception which has grown up in
this Ambassador?s mind about the consequences of the United
States entering the war. He should surely be told forthwith that
the entry of the United States into war, either with Germany and
Italy or with Japan, is fully conformable with British interests.
2. That nothing in the munitions sphere can compare with the
importance of the British Empire and the United States being cobelligerents.
That if Japan attacked the United States without
declaring war on us, we should at once range ourselves at the
side of the United States and declare war upon Japan.
Prime Minister to General Ismay. 29.IX.40.
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to Minister of Supply and President of the Board of
Trade.
30.IX.40.
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.
687
It is astonishing how this misleading Kennedy 11 stud, that we
should do better with a neutral United States than with her
warring at our side, should have travelled so far. A clear directive
is required to all our Ambassadors in countries concerned.
? Anyone can see that aircraft are needed in the Middle East.
What is not so easy is whether they can be spared here.
Remember that we are still vastly inferior in numbers, both of
fighters and bombers, to the German air forces, and that heavy
losses have been sustained by our air production. The Chief of
the Air Staff and Secretary of State must be asked for a precise
recommendation.
I have received your telegram with great pleasure, and I send my
best wishes to you and to all other Frenchmen who are resolved
to fight on with us. We shall stand resolutely together until all
obstacles have been overcome and we share in the triumph of
our cause.
This development of Radar with German long-range coastal
batteries is serious. We have for a long time been on the track of
this device, and I drew attentio though eminently desirable, is not essential to
the seizure and retention of the iron-fields. While therefore every
preparation to send the Fleet in should continue, and strong efforts
should be made, it would be wrong to try it unless we can see our
way to maintaining it under air attack, and still more wrong to make
the seizure of the iron -fields dependent upon the sending of a
surface fleet. Let us advance with confidence and see how the naval
side develops as events unfold.
And again a week later:
I have carefully considered all the papers you have been good enough to
send me in reply to my various minutes about ?Catherine.? I have come
reluctantly but quite definitely to the conclusion that the operation we
outlined in the autumn will not be practicable this year. We have not yet
obtained sufficient mastery over U-boats, mines, and raiders to enable us to
fit for their special duties the many smaller vessels required. The problem of
making our ships comparatively secure against air attack has not been
solved. The dive-bomber remains a formidable menace. The rockets [called
for secrecy ?the U.P. weapon,? i.e., unrotated projectilefor handling the ammunition supply
problem, and also that firings on the 1917/18 scale are not to be
expected in the present war.
4. Intense efforts must be made to complete the equipment of
our Army at home and of our Army in the Middle East. The most
serious weak points are tanks and small-arms ammunition,
particularly the special types; anti-tank guns and rifles, and even
more their ammunition; trench mortars, and still more their
ammunition; and rifles. We hope to obtain an additional two
hundred and fifty thousand rifles from the United States, but it is
lamentable that we should be told that no more than half a
million additional rifles can be manufactured here before the end
of 1941. Surely, as large numbers of our Regular Army proceed
abroad, the need of the Home Guard and of garrison troops for
home defence on a far larger scale than at present will be felt. A
substantial increase in rifle-making capacity is necessary.
5. The danger of invasion will not disappear with the coming of
winter, and may confront us with novel possibilities in the coming
year. The enemy?s need to strike down this country will naturally
increase as the war progresses, and all kinds of appliances for
crossing the seas that do not now exist may be devised. Actual
invasion must be regarded as perpetually threatened, but unlikely
to materialise as long as strong forces stand in this island. Apart
from this, the only major theatre of war which can be foreseen in
1940/41 is the Middle East. Here we must endeavour to bring
into action British, Australasian, and Indian forces, on a scale
which should only be limited by sea transport and local
maintenance. We must expect to fight in Egypt and the Soudan,
in Turkey, Syria, or Palestine, and possibly in Iraq and Persia.
Fifteen British divisions, six Australasian, and at least six Indian
divisions should be prepared for these theatres, these forces not
being, however, additional to the fifty-five divisions which have
been mentioned. One would not imagine that the ammunition
expenditure would approach the last-war scale. Air power and
mechanised troops will be the dominant factors.
450
6 There remain the possibilities of amphibious aggressive warfare
against the enemy or enemy-held territory in Europe or North
Africa. But the needs of such operations will be provided by the
arms and supplies already mentioned in general terms.
7. Our task, as the Minister of Supply rightly reminds us, is indeedgrievous aggravation [ofagainst us. It is therefore a race. They will not be able to get
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
27.VI.40.
Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.
29.VI.40.
173
the captured factories working immediately, and meanwhile we
shall get round the invasion danger through the growth of our
defences and Army strength. But what sort of relative outputs
must be faced next year unless we are able to bomb the newly
acquired German plants? Germany also, being relieved from the
need of keeping a gigantic army in constant contact with the
French Army, must have spare capacity for the air and other
methods of attacking us. Must we not expect this will be very
great? How soon can it come into play? Hitherto I have been
looking at the next three months because of the emergency, but
what about 1941? It seems to me that only immense American
supplies can be of use in turning the corner.
* * * * *
As the month of June ground itself out, the sense of potential invasion at any
moment grew upon us all.
The Admiralty charts of tides and state of the moon, Humber,
Thames Estuary, Beachy Head, should be studied with a view to
ascertaining on which days conditions will be most favourable to
a sea-borne landing. The Admiralty view is sought.
A landing or descent in Ireland was always a deep anxiety to the Chiefs of
Staff. But our resources seemed to me too limited for serious troop
movements.
It would be taking an undue risk to remove one of our only two
thoroughly equipped divisions out of Great Britain at this
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
30.VI.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
30.VI.40.
174
juncture. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Irish situation will
require the use of divisional formations complete with their
technical vehicles as if for Continental war. The statement that it
would take ten days to transport a division from this country to
Ireland, even though every preparation can be made beforehand,
is not satisfactory. Schemes should be prepared to enable two or
three lightly equipped brigades to move at short notice, and in
not more than three days, into Northern Ireland. Duplicate
transport should be sent on ahead. It would be a mistake to send
any large force of artillery to Ireland. It is not at all likely that a
naval descent will be effected there. Air-borne descents cannot
carry much artillery. Finally, nothing that can happen in Ireland
can be immediately decisive.
* * * * *
In bringing home themust
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. 13.X.40.
Prime Minister to Sir James Grigg.
13.X.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
14.X.40.
Prime Minister to First Lord.
15.X.40.
689
be counted the Tirpitz and the Bismarck.? This is not true, as
even the Bismarck has, I suppose, to work up, like the King
George V, which should be ready as soon, or earlier. The Tirpitz
is three months behind the Bismarck, according to every
statement I have received, and it is hoped by that time we shall
have the Prince of Wales and Queen Elizabeth. If such statements
are made to the Cabinet, I should be forced to challenge them.
2. The whole argument is meant to lead up to the idea that we
must submit to the wishes of Vichy because they have the power
to drive us out of Gibraltar by bombing. I fully share the desire of
the Naval Staff not to be molested in Gibraltar, but I do not think
that the enforcement of the blockade will lead the French to do
this, still less to declare war upon us. I do not believe the Vichy
Government has the power to wage war against us, as the whole
French nation is coming more and more onto our side. I have
dealt with this in a Minute on general policy which is being
circulated, and of which I enclose you the relevant extract.
3. The redeeming point in this paper is the suggestion that we
should tell the Vichy Government that if they bomb Gibraltar we
shall retaliate not against, say, Casablanca, but Vichy, to which I
would add, or any other place occupied by the Vichy Government.
This is the proper note to strike, and it is also important to bear
in mind that while humbleness to Vichy will not necessarily
prevent them being ordered to make war upon us by their
German masters, a firm attitude will not necessarily deter them
from coming over to our side.
These questions are not urgent because of the failure to intercept
Primaguet. 13
What arrangements have we got for blind landings for aircraft?
How many aircraft are so fitted? It ought to be possible to guide
them down quite safely, as commercial craft were done before
the war in spite of fog. Let me have full particulars. The accidents
Prime Minister to C.A.S.
18.X.40.
690
last night are very serious.
I was very much pleased last week when you told me you
proposed to give an armoured division to Major-General
Hobart.14 I think very highly of this officer, and I am not at all
impressed by the prejudices against him in certain quarters. Such
prejudices attach fbegins.
* * * * *
In October, Mussolini, undeterred by belated British naval movements, launched the Italian
armies upon the invasion of Abyssinia. On the tenth, by the votes of fifty sovereign states
to one, the Assembly of the League resolved to take collective measures against Italy, and
a committee of eighteen was appointed to make further efforts for a peaceful solution.
Mussolini, thus confronted, made a clear-cut statement, marked by deep shrewdness.
Instead of saying, ?Italy will meet sanctions with war,? he said: ?Italy will meet them with
discipline, with frugality, and with sacrifice.? At the same time, however, he intimated that
he would not tolerate the imposition of any sanctions which hampered his invasion of
Abyssinia. If that enterprise were endangered, he would go to war with whoever stood in
his path. ?Fifty nations!? he said. ?Fifty nations, led by one!? Such was the position in the
weeks which preceded the dissolution of Parliament in Britain and the general election,
which was now constitutionally due.
* * * * *
Bloodshed in Abyssinia, hatred of Fascism, the invocation of sanctions by the League,
produced a convulsion within the British Labour Party. Trade-unionists, among whom Mr.
Ernest Bevin was outstanding, were by no means pacifist by temperament. A very strong
desire to fight the Italian Dictator, to enforce sanctions of a decisive character, and to use
the British Fleet, if need be, surged through the sturdy wage-earners. Rough and harsh
words were spoken at excited meetings. On one occasion Mr. Bevin complained that ?he
was tired of having George Lansbury's conscience carted about from conference to
conference.? Many members of the Parliamentary Labour Party shared the trade-union
mood. In a far wider sphere, all the leaders of the League of Nations Union felt themselves
bound to the cause of the League. Clause 5 of their ?Peace Ballot? was plainly involved.
Here were principles in obedience to which lifelong humanitarians were ready to die, and if
to die, also to kill. On October 8, Mr. Lansbury resigned his leadership of the Parliamentary
136
Labour Party, and Major Attlee, who had a fine war record, reigned in his stead.
* * * * *
But this national awakening was not in accord with Mr. Baldwin's outlook or intentions. It
was not till several months after the election that I began to understand the principles upon
which ?sanctions? were founded. The Prime Minister had declared that sanctions
5. The tank story is somewhat different, and it is right to
minimise by local cannon and obstacles the landing places of
tanks. The Admiralty should report upon the size, character, and
speed of potential tank-carrying barges or floats, whether they
will be self-propelled or towed and by what craft. As they can
hardly go above seven miles an hour, they should be detected in
summertime after they have started, and even in fog or haze the
R.D.F. stations should give warning while they are still several
hours from land. The destroyers issuing from the sally-ports must
strike at these with gusto. The arrangement of stops and blocks
held by local sedentary forces should be steadily developed, and
anti-tank squads formed. Our own tank reserve must engage the
surviving invader tanks, and no doubt it is held in a position
which allows swift railing [transport by raildo not want to fight. They try to draw back as
slowly as possible, but they do not want to fight. Our conversations with the
British have ended. Nothing was accomplished. I have telephoned to
Ribbentrop saying it was a fiasco, absolutely innocuous. Chamberlain's eyes
filled with tears as the train started moving and his countrymen started
singing, ?For he's a jolly good fellow.? ?What is this little song?? asked
Mussolini.
19
Prague, Albania, and the Polish Guarantee
January? April, 1939
259
And then a fortnight later:
Lord Perth has submitted for our approval the outlines of the speech
that Chamberlain will make in the House of Commons in order that
we may suggest changes if necessary. The Duce approved it, and
commented: ?I believe this is the first time that the head of the
British Government has submitted to a foreign Government the
outlines of one of his speeches. It's a bad sign for them.? 1
However, in the end it was Ciano and Mussolini who went to their doom.
Meanwhile, on January 18, Ribbentrop was at Warsaw to open the diplomatic offensive
against Poland. The absorption of Czechoslovakia was to be followed by the encirclement of
Poland. The first stage in this operation would be the cutting-off of Poland from the sea by
the assertion of German sovereignty in Danzig and by the prolongation of the German
control of the Baltic to the vital Lithuanian port of Memel. The Polish Government displayed
strong resistance to this pressure, and for a while Hitler watched and waited for the
campaigning season.
During the second week of March, rumours gathered of troop movements in Germany and
Austria, particularly in the Vienna-Salzburg region. Forty German divisions were reported to
be mobilised on a war footing. Confident of German support, the Slovaks were planning the
separation of their territory from the Czechoslovak Republic. Colonel Beck, relieved to see
the Teutonic wind blowing in another direction, declared publicly in Warsaw that his
Government had full sympathy with the aspirations of the Slovaks. Father Tiso, the Slovak
leader, was received by Hitler in Berlin with the honours due to a Prime Minister. On the
twelfth Mr. Chamberlain, questioned in Parliament about the guarantee of the Czechoslovak
frontier, reminded the House that this proposal had been directed against unprovoked
aggression. No such aggression had yet taken place. He did not have long to wait.
* * * * *
A wave of perverse optimism had swep I have little doubt that the President's
speech against dictatorships has been largely influenced by our talk, and I
trust that the ground on the tariff and currency side is also being explored.
Thank you so much for your letter of September 20, and for the generous
things you have written about Nyon, which I much appreciate. I thought
your summing up of the position at Nyon, ?It is only rarely that an
opportunity comes when stern and effective measures can be brought to
Mr. Churchill to Mr. Eden. 20.IX.37.
Mr. Eden to Mr. Churchill. 25.IX.37.
189
bear upon an evil-doer without incurring the risk of war,? effectively
described the position. Mussolini has been unwise enough to overstep the
limits, and he has had to pay the penalty. There is no doubt that the
spectacle of eighty Anglo -French destroyers patrolling the Mediterranean
assisted by a considerable force of aircraft has made a profound impression
on opinion in Europe. From reports which I have received, Germany herself
has not been slow to take note of this fact. It was a great relief, both to
Delbos and me, to be able to assert the position of our respective countries
in this way in the autumn of a year in which we have inevitably had to be so
much on the defensive. There is plenty of trouble ahead, and we are not
yet, of course, anything like as strong in the military sense as I would wish,
but Nyon has enabled us to improve our position and to gain more time.
I also cordially agree with you on the importance of the Anglo-French cooperation
which we have now created in the Mediterranean. The whole
French attitude was, of course, fundamentally different from that which
prevailed when Laval was in command. The French Naval Staff could not
have been more helpful, and they really made a great effort to make an
important contribution to the joint force. Our Admiralty were, I am sure,
impressed. Moreover, the mutual advantages to which you refer in respect
of the use of each other's bases are very valuable. Nor will Italian
participation, whatever its ultimate form, be able to affect the realities of the
situation.
The Nyon Conference, although an incident, is a proof of how powerful the combined
influence of Britain and France, if expressed with conviction and a readiness to use force,
would have been upon the mood and policy of the Dictators. That such a policy would have
prevented war at this stage cannot be asserted. It might easily have delayed it. It is the
where our
interesting invalid [the Nelsonthat the first eight battalions leave India on
their voyage round the Cape, arriving only July 25.
2. The Australians are coming in the big ships, but they seem to
have wasted a week at Capetown, and are now only proceeding
at eighteen knots, instead of the twenty I was assured were
possible. It is hoped they will be here about the 15th. Is this so?
At any rate, whenever they arrive, the big ships should be
immediately filled with Territorials ? the more the better ?
preferably twelve battalions, and sent off to India at full speed.
As soon as they arrive in India, they should embark another eight
Regular battalions for this country, making the voyage again at
full speed. They should then take another batch of Territorials to
India. Future transferences can be discussed later? . All I am
asking now is that the big ships should go to and fro at full
speed.
3. I am very sorry indeed to find the virtual deadlock which local
objections have imposed upon the battalions from Palestine. It is
quite natural that General Wavell should look at the situation only
from his own viewpoint. Here we have to think of building up a
good army in order to make up, as far as possible, for the
lamentable failure to support the French by an adequate B.E.F.
during the first year of the war. Do you realise that in the first
year of the late war we brought forty-seven divisions into action,
and that these were men's rolex watch divisions of twelve battalions plus one
Pioneer battalion, not nine as now? We are indeed the victims of
a feeble and weary departmentalism.
4. Owing to the saving of the B.E.F., I have been willing to wait
for the relief of the eight battalions from Palestine by eight native
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
6.VI.40.
164
Indian battalions, provided these latter were sent at once; but
you give me no time-table for this. I have not yet received any
report on whether it is possible to send these British battalions
and their Indian relief via Basra and the Persian Gulf. Perhaps
you would very kindly let me have this in the first instance.
5. I am prepared also to consider as an alternative, or an
immediate step, the sending home [i.e., to Britainto First and Second Sea Lords in the sense of
surmounting the difficulties. I am very clear that the Admirals of the Fleet
should remain on the Active List like Field-Marshals, and should not be
penalised for winning promotion unduly young. You might explain to the
Treasury privately that no money is involved. What is the value of being
made Admiral of the Fleet if it is only to hoist the Union flag for one day and
retire to Cheltenham, writing occasional letters to The Times?
There must be no discrimination on grounds of race or colour [in the
employment of Indians or Colonial natives in the Royal NavyWe know President is our best friend, but it is
no use trying to dance attendance upon Republican and
Democratic Conventions. What really matters is whether Hitler is
master of Britain in three months or not. I think not. But this is a
matter which cannot be argued beforehand. Your mood should
be bland and phlegmatic. No one is downhearted here.
* * * * *
In the closing days at Bordeaux, Admiral Darlan became very important. My
contacts with him had been few and formal. I respected him for the work he
had done in re-creating the French Navy, which after ten years of his
professional control was more efficient than at any time since the French
Revolution. When in November, 1939, he had visited England, we gave him an
official dinner at the Admiralty. In response to the toast, he began by
reminding us that his great-grandfather had been killed at the Battle of
Trafalgar. I therefore thought of him as one of those good Frenchmen who
hate England. Our Anglo-French naval discussions in January had also shown
how very jealous the Admiral was of his professional position in relation to
whoever was the political Minister of Marine. This had become a positive
obsession, and I believe played a definite part in his action.
228
For the rest, Darlan had been present at most of the conferences which I have
described, and as the end of the French resistance approached, he had
repeatedly assured me that whatever happened the French Fleet should never
fall into German hands. Now at Bordeaux came the fateful moment in the
career of this ambitious, self-seeking, and capable Admiral. His authority over
the Fleet was for all practical purposes absolute. He had only to order the
ships to British, American, or French colonial harbours ? some had already
started ? to be obeyed. In the morning of June 17, after the fall of M.
Reynaud?s Cabinet, he declared to General Georges that he was resolved to
give the order. The next day Georges met him in the afternoon and asked him
what had happened. Darlan replied that he had changed his mind. When
asked why, he answered simply, ?I am now Minister of Marine.? This did not
mean that he had changed his mind in order to become Minister of Marine,
but that being Minister of Marine he had a different point of view.
How vain are human calculations of self-interest! Rarely has there been a
more convincing example. Admiral Darlan had but to sail in any one of his
ships to any port outside France to become the mis not to be
waited for in the case of the Weser operation; overcast, foggy weather is
more satisfactory for the latter. The general state of preparedness of the
naval forces and ships is at present good.
* * * * *
From the beginning of the year, the Soviets had brought their main power to bear on the
Finns. They redoubled their efforts to pierce the Mannerheim Line before the melting of the
snows. Alas, this year the spring and its thaw, on which the hard-pressed Finns based their
hopes, came nearly six weeks late. The great Soviet offensive on the Isthmus, which was
to last forty-two days, opened on February 1, combined with heavy air -bombing of base
depots and railway junctions behind the lines. Ten days of heavy bombardment from Soviet
guns, massed wheel to wheel, heralded the main infantry attack. After a fortnight's
fighting, the line was breached. The air attacks on the key fort and base of Viipuri
increased in intensity. By the end of the month, the Mannerheim defence system had been
disorganised, and the Russians were able to concentrate against the Gulf of Viipuri. The
Finns were short of ammunition and their troops exhausted.
The honourable correctitude which had deprived us of any strategic initiative equally
hampered all effective measures for sending munitions to Finland. We had been able so far
only to send from our own scanty store contributions insignificant to the Finns. In France,
however, a warmer and deeper sentiment prevailed, and this was strongly fostered by M.
Daladier. On March 2, without consulting the British Government, he agreed to send fifty
thousand volunteers and a hundred bombers to Finland. We could certainly not act on this
scale, and in view of the documents found on the German major in Belgium, and of the
ceaseless Intelligence reports of the steady massing of German troops on the Western
432
Front, it went far beyond what prudence would allow. However, it was agreed to send fifty
British bombers. On March 12, the Cabinet again decided to revise the plans for military
landings at Narvik and Trondheim, to be followed at Stavanger and Bergen, as a part of the
extended help to Finland into which we had been drawn by the French. These plans were
to be available for action on March 20, although the need of Norwegian and Swedish
permission had not been met. Meanwhile, on March 7, Mr. Paasikivi had gone again to
Moscow; this time to discuss armistice terms. On the twelfth, the Russian terms we
One of the most fascinating works of history ever written, Winston Churchill's monumental
The Second World War is a six -volume account of the struggle of the Allied powers in
Europe against Germany and the Axis. Told through the eyes of British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, The Second World War is also the story of one nation's singular, heroic
role in the fight against tyranny. Pride and patriotism are evident everywhere in Churchill's
dramatic account and for good reason. Having learned a lesson at Munich that they would
never forget, the British refused to make peace with Hitler, defying him even after France
had fallen and after it seemed as though the Nazis were unstoppable. Churchill remained
unbowed throughout, as did the people of Britain in whose determination and courage he
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Patriotic as Churchill was, he managed to maintain a balanced impartiality in his description
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retrospective analysis of the war, to be sure; but we are also presented with memos,
letters, orders, speeches, and telegrams that give a day-by-day account of the reactionsboth
mistaken and justified-to the unfolding drama. Strategies and counterstrategies
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Gathering Storm considers the stipulations and consequences of the Treaty of Versailles,
the rise of Adolf Hitler, the capitulation at Munich and the entry of the British into the war.
The volume is pervaded by Churchill's somber feeling that the Second World War was
largely a se If you keep on talking this rubbish, saying I?m your wife and what not, just watch me cut your head off.? She raised her saber as she said this.
Yang Guo held his head and jumped to the side and pleaded, ?Miss, I won?t say it anymore.?
The girl said, ?Look at you, even an ugly old hag wouldn?t marry you.? Yang Guo laughed foolishly and didn?t reply.
Now, the sky was dark, the two stood in the unkempt land; they turned around, and saw smoke from cooking rising up from the town a |
| 